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Abstract
A recent New Political Economy article by Baines and Hager (2020) cri-
tiqued Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s capital-as-power (CasP)
model of the stock market (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016). Bichler and Nitzan’s
model of the stock market seeks to explain how financial crises are tied
to the (upper) limits of redistributing income through power. Bichler and
Nitzan use American financial data to show that “U.S.-based capitalists”
have risen to a great height of power, relative to the underlying popula-
tion. This height also produces a “forward-looking” fear about the ability
to accumulate even more (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016).
Baines and Hager took the important step of examining the CasP
model with financial data from four other countries–France, Germany,
Great Britain and Japan. They argue that these countries follow some
of the patterns of the United States, but not all. These differences in
patterns matter because Baines and Hager are curious to know how the
CasP model of the stock market can function as a general model of capital
accumulation at an international level.
This paper will respond to the part of Baines and Hager’s paper where
they analyze “systemic fear” in the stock markets of France, Germany,
Great Britain and Japan. It argues that Baines and Hager were perhaps
too quick to dismiss systemic fear as a concept to study national and
regional differences in international political economy. This concept is
still in its infancy and, with more consideration, there are opportunities
to investigate the characteristics of systemic fear.
By re-examining systemic fear in twelve countries, this paper will show
the potential for the concept of systemic fear to support the study of
capitalist crisis and national diversity in capitalist development.
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1 Introduction
A recent New Political Economy article by Baines and Hager (2020) critiqued
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s capital-as-power (CasP) model of the
stock market (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016). Bichler and Nitzan’s model of the stock
market seeks to explain how financial crises are tied to the (upper) limits of re-
distributing income through power. Their model uses American financial data
to show that “U.S.-based capitalists” have risen to a great height of capital-
ized power, relative to the underlying population. This height also produces a
“forward-looking” fear about the ability to accumulate even more (Bichler &
Nitzan, 2016).1
Baines and Hager examined the CasP model with financial data of four other
countries–France, Germany, Great Britain and Japan. With a careful step-by-
step approach, Baines and Hager identified where in Bichler and Nitzan’s argu-
ment these countries had similar patterns to the United States and where they
did not. Overall, Baines and Hager are concerned with the national differences
in the CasP model, as they are curious to know how the CasP model of the
stock market can function as a general model of capital accumulation at an
international level. Based on their findings, they argue that the CasP model of
the stock market is likely not suited to analyze the “the global unevenness and
continued national diversity in capitalist development” (Baines & Hager, 2020,
p. 137).
Baines and Hager’s article is rich with details that can engender lots of
future research and dialogue in political economy. My paper only responds to
a specific aspect of Baines and Hager’s paper. In section four of their NPE
article, Baines and Hager examine Bichler and Nitzan’s concept of systemic
fear, which is applied to the stock markets of the countries listed above. Bichler
and Nitzan created this concept to theorize the effects of capitalists reaching
limits in accumulating power. Systemic fear is low when capitalist power is
low, because there is “scope for increasing [capitalist power] further: income
can be further redistributed in favour of profit, hype can be further amplified,
profit volatility can be further decreased and the normal rate of return can be
further lowered” (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016, italics in original, p. 143). Systemic
fear, according to Bichler and Nitzan, rises with rising capitalist power because
“capitalized power is not unbounded” (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016, p. 143). As
more things are done to increase power, such as decreasing profit volatility, it
becomes harder to go even further in the interest of power. When power is
already high, resistance from below grows and capitalists do not see the future
as an open frontier of opportunity. In this state, systemic fear is the other side of
high capitalist confidence: the “future is too bleak to rely on” and “reassurance
1Readers unfamiliar with how Bichler and Nitzan use the terms “power” and “accumula-
tion” should start with Nitzan and Bichler (2009). Their methods are easy to understand but
the reader is asked to pay special attention to the theoretical assumptions that are rejected.
For example, in their paper that presents a CasP model of the stock market, they reject the
idea that there can be mismatches between nominal financial prices and real economic units
of production and consumption (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016).
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[for capitalists] can come only from current profit” (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016, p.
142).
In their response, Baines and Hager follow the methods of Bichler and Nitzan
and produce quantitative indices of systemic fear for France, Germany, Great
Britain, and Japan. As an empirical measure, systemic fear measures a moving
correlation of past earnings and stock prices, which conventional finance says
should be forward-looking. As of this writing, the index is produced in two
steps. As shown in Figure 1, a 12-month trailing correlation is made between
prices and earnings. In the short term this trailing correlation bounces up and
down between 1 and -1. In step two, one takes a longer-term moving average of
this trailing correlation (B in Figure 1). This transformation of the time series
reveals the annual or even decennial trends in the correlation between prices
and earnings.
Overall, Baines and Hager are skeptical that,across the world, “capitalists
[are] anxious that their dominant position is under threat, and [that] when
an upper-bound limit of power is reached, they become fearful and backward-
looking”(Baines & Hager, 2020, p. 124). They recognize the very strong results
of the United States, but see concerning differences elsewhere. They do not
find strong evidence of rising systemic fear at an international level. They
also conclude that Germany is the only positive result when they measure the
correlation between systemic fear and Bichler and Nitzan’s “power index”. The
power index is a ratio of stock index price (such as the S&P 500) to the average
wage rate. This power index is a representation of how a capitalists (who have
significant stakes in the stock market) succeed or fail relative to the underlying
population (who primarily rely on wage income). Based on evidence of the
United States, Bichler and Nitzan argue that systemic fear is the dialectical
“other” of the power index. Significant increases in the power index produces
systemic fear as it is increasingly difficult to see further increases of the index
in the future.
I focus my attention on this part of Baines and Hager’s article for two rea-
sons. First, Baines and Hager correctly identify systemic fear to be a distin-
guishing feature of Bichler and Nitzan’s writings on capitalist crisis. Systemic
fear signals a breakdown in the forward-looking ritual of capitalization, which
discounts future expectations to present prices. Bichler and Nitzan argue that
this form of breakdown is very significant because capitalization “is necessary
for the existence of modern capitalism, at least in its present form”:
Suppose for argument’s sake that capitalists, instead of expecting
capitalization to continue indefinitely, believed that the process would
cease to exist at some future point. At that point, with capitaliza-
tion gone, their assets would have a nil value, by definition; and with
future prices being zero, current prices would have nowhere to trend
but down. Now, the fact that capitalists invest shows that they ex-
pect the very opposite – i.e., that the value of their assets will grow,
not contract – and that expectation means that, consciously or not,
they also think that the ritual that valuates their assets will never
4
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Figure 1: Constructing the systemic fear index (with GBR data)
See Table 2 for the creation of the systemic fear index. See Tables 4 and 5 for
breakdown of United Kingdom data.
end. (Bichler & Nitzan, 2010)
Second, their analysis of systemic fear is where, in my opinion, Baines and
Hager overlook opportunities to investigate and experiment within the CasP
model. Differences between their results and those of Bichler and Nitzan are
discovered, but they are not transformed into follow-up questions about why
these differences exist. Instead, the test for systemic fear outside the United
States is taken as an opportunity for Baines and Hager to state that it “may
be time to move beyond systemic fear as a conceptual basis for modelling the
stock market” (Baines & Hager, 2020, p. 133). As I will argue below, Baines
and Hager might be too impatient with the object of their critique.
The main body of this paper is broken into three sections. Section 2 sum-
marizes how I prepared the data to engage with Baines and Hager’s critique of
Bichler and Nitzan. My analysis also expands in breadth (more countries) and
depth (more measures of power and systemic fear). These expansions are more
experimental than otherwise–they are done in search of more evidence, which
could be used for or against Bichler and Nitzan’s conceptualization of systemic
fear and its links to power.
Section 3 analyzes examples of how Baines and Hager critique the concept
of systemic fear. Performing a critique is certainly not an issue on principle, but
I argue that Baines and Hager’s are too quick in their judgment, particularly
because they rely on their own definitions of systemic and crisis to arrive at
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their conclusion. To my knowledge, Bichler and Nitzan have not presented
firm opinions on how systemic fear would be measured across different stock
markets. Thus, when Baines and Hager take their arguments to an international
dimension there is no body of literature to stand on–they are creating standards
to analyze the international dimensions of systemic fear. This situation is what
makes their article an exciting contribution to political economy. But it is also
puzzling why they appear to be closing a debate that still has many unexplored
pathways.
Section 4 is inspired by Baines and Hager’s primary interest in seeing what
is happening in advanced capitalist countries around the world. By trying to
get as much historical data as possible, I hope to re-open the debate on the
meaning of systemic fear and on the evidence of systemic fear’s relationship
with capitalized power. Section 4 has three goals:
1. To experiment with the parameters and variables of systemic fear and
power, as long as they are conceptually consistent with the arguments of
Bichler and Nitzan.
2. To discover if there is, despite national differences, evidence of rising sys-
temic fear at an international level.
3. To discover if there is, despite national differences, statistical significance
for a positive relationship between systemic fear and power at an interna-
tional level.
2 Data Preparation
This section outlines how data was retrieved and prepared for this paper.
2.1 Countries and their stock markets
Hitherto, systemic fear has been analyzed in the context of national markets.
I retrieved United States data to replicate Bichler and Nitzan’s measurements,
and I retrieved the data of France, Germany, Japan and Great Britain to repli-
cate the measurements of Baines and Hager. In curious search of more data, I
retrieved the necessary data for Australia, Canada, Netherlands, South Africa,
South Korea, Sweden and Switzerland.
Table 1 shows the geographical and historical scopes of this paper. Within
these scopes of research there are various time series needed to produce measures
of systemic fear and power. The metadata for these measures are introduced in
step-by-step fashion in tables, notes and an appendix.
2.2 Six measurements
Tables 2 and 3 introduce the six measurements that will be referred to often, in
both text and in graphs. The measurements with a subscript of 1 (S1 and P1)
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Table 1: Country and stock index metadata, sorted by alpha-3 code
Country alpha-3 code Stock Index*
Australia AUS ASX All-ordinaries
Canada CAN S&P/TSX 300
Switzerland CHE SMI
Germany DEU CDAX
France FRA CAC All-tradable
United Kingdom GBR FTSE All-share
Japan JPN Nikkei 225
South Korea KOR KOSPI
Netherlands NLD AEX All-share
Sweden SWE OMX Stockholm All-Share
United States USA S&P 500 Composite
South Africa ZAF FTSE/JSE All-Share
* Present-day titles of the indices are used. Global Financial Data
details how each index is spliced when there are changes to the number
of firms in the index. For detailed breakdown of prices, see Table 4
in Appendix. For detailed breakdown of P/E ratio, see Table 5 in
Appendix.
are the same as the measurements used by our two pairs of authors–Baines and
Hager, and Bichler and Nitzan. Measurements with subscripts of 2 and 3 are
new. They are products of experimenting with the parameters and variables of
systemic fear and power. When referring to the conceptual ideas behind specific
measurements, I will sometimes use Si and Pi as abstract symbols.
Table 2: Methods to produce time series of systemic fear
Idx. Correlation of ... Window Transformations
S1 levels (P ∼ E) 12 months 120-month trailing average
S2 levels (P ∼ E) 12 months 120-month trailing average; sea-
sonal decomposition (trend)
S3 12-month differ-
ences (∆P ∼ ∆E)
120 months 12-month trailing average
Sources: Global Financial Data for composite index prices and P/E ratio. Earnings are
found in P/E ratio. For detailed breakdown of prices, see Table 4 in Appendix. For detailed
breakdown of P/E ratio, see Table 5 in Appendix.
2.3 Stock market price and earnings data
As is the case with many political-economic research questions, availability of
historical financial data can be difficult to find for countries other than the
United States. For example, when Baines and Hager construct indices of sys-
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Table 3: Methods to produce time series of power indices
Idx. Numerator Denominator Transformations
P1 Close Price Wage Rate log; series mean = 100
P2 Close Price Income per capita (Nominal) log; series mean = 100
P3 Close Price GDP per capita (Nominal) log; series mean = 100
Sources: Global Financial Data for composite index prices and GDP per capita.
Income per capita (Nominal), for each country, from 1950 to 2018, taken from World
Inequality Database (https://wid.world/). For detailed breakdown of wage rates,
with data sources, see Table 7 in Appendix. For detailed breakdown of GDP per
capita, see Table 5 in Appendix.
temic fear for other countries, the time series are, in comparison to the United
States, shorter in overall length and they begin closer to the present day. Short
time series are especially troublesome when creating an index of systemic fear:
as a moving correlation between price and earnings, the measurement is limited
by the shortest series in the pair.
Global Financial Data (GFD), through its platform “Finaeon”, provides us
with a way to produce longer time series of prices and earnings for composite
indices. GFD provides price-earnings ratio data. When used with price data,
we can solve for earnings per share:
earnings = price× 1
PEratio
(1)
Ideally, we would have long time series of raw earnings-per-share data, but
solving for earnings with a price-earnings ratio is an adequate workaround. To
confirm this workaround, Figure 2 produces the same measure of American
systemic fear with two independent methods. The thin line uses the same
dataset that Bichler and Nitzan uses (updated to 2020). This dataset contains
price and earnings-per-share data for the S&P 500. The darker line is the
product of Equation 1. As indicated by a near-perfect correlation, the differences
between the methods are extremely minor.
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Figure 2: USA: Systemic fear, constructed with two methods
Source and methods: Shiller’s dataset
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on May 19,
2020) for the dataset used by (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016). See Table 2 for the
creation of S1. See Tables 4 and 5 for breakdown of United States data.
3 Baines and Hager’s critique of systemic fear
As was stated in the introduction, Baines and Hager’s critique of systemic fear
is perhaps too quick in its judgment. Their judgment could ultimately turn
out to be best, but, as is the case in Kliman (2011), an alternative to the
perceived faults in Bichler and Nitzan’s model was not fully explored. Baines
and Hager discovered that there are differences between the United States and
other advanced capitalist countries, but there is room to explore the significance
of these differences. With more data and a pinch of experimentation, we can
re-consider the place of national differences in a larger model of systemic fear.
The remainder of this section looks at Baines and Hager’s interpretation
of what makes a phenomenon systemic. From their interpretation of when
and how international systemic fear should occur, Baines and Hager express
skepticism when systemic fear is not rising at particular times, such as Brexit,
or collectively, across all major stock markets.
As assistance to this analysis of Baines and Hager’s interpretation, two fig-
ures can act as “preambles” to the following sub-sections. Figure 3 follows
the same methods as Baines and Hager and shows the relationship between
the “original” systemic fear index (S1) and the power index (P1) for eleven
countries. The plot of South Africa is missing due to a lack of wage data. (Ex-
trapolating from Figure 13, the S1-P1 correlation for ZAF is likely moderate
but negative). Plotting with more historical data and adding more countries
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is unlikely to resolve Baines and Hager’s skepticism. The United States has
the strongest positive correlation, countries such as Germany, Canada and Swe-
den have strong positive correlations, but there are weak correlations elsewhere.
In particular, two of the countries first analyzed by Baines and Hager–Great
Britain and France–have weak positive correlations.
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Figure 3: S1 v. P1, by country
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S1 and Table 3 for the
creation of P1. See Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
Figure 4 shows three measures of average systemic fear. The reasons for
experimenting with the measure of systemic fear will appear later. In the mean-
time, we can see that the mean trend across all countries is trending upward
in all three measures of systemic fear. The presence of a rising average will
prove to be very important. In probability theory the average is often treated
as the expected value. Thus, there can be differences in the independent events
of systemic fear (i.e., the systemic fear of an individual country), and some of
these events can even be trending downwards; but the expected outcome, based
on the average, is rising.
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Figure 4: Three measures of systemic fear (S1, S2, S3): Averages
and standard deviations of 12 countries.
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See
Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
3.1 Meaning of systemic
... if capitalist fear is systemic, then it should be global given the
integrated nature of the world’s financial system. That is to say,
the strong correlation between EPS and stock prices that BN find in
the US over recent years should also be evident in the major stock
markets the world over. In our own research, however, we find little
evidence of systemic fear as a global affliction. (Baines & Hager,
2020, p. 131)
The above quotation is a key part of Baines and Hager’s argument that,
by its very definition, systemic fear should be evident at a global scale. The
premise of this critique makes sense, given the assumption that global finance
is an integrated system of markets. Yet notice that Baines and Hager do not
provide clear standards for labeling processes “systemic”. How many countries
need to have a strong correlation like the United States? To have international
systemic fear, does every measure of S1 need to be above a certain value? Must
there be a long-term average of high systemic fear? Must the S1 of each country
move up and down together?
This paper cannot answer all these questions in great detail, but we can
suggest that if questions like these are being overlooked, we might not be pre-
pared to fully assess the international relevancy of Bichler and Nitzan’s concept.
Figure 3 confirms there are national differences in the relationship between P1
and S1, but, to embody the skepticism of Hume (1985), we are still missing
a set of rules to determine if “systemic” is a misleading term for the causes of
these national differences. For instance, evidence is showing that multiple major
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stock markets produce similar results to the United States–Germany (+0.74),
Sweden (+0.63), Canada (+0.57), and Australia (+0.53). Japan and Korea can
be added to this list if we include countries that have higher positive correla-
tions than +0.40, a common benchmark for a moderate relationship between
variables.
We certainly cannot ignore the negative results. For instance, Great Britain’s
weak positive correlation (+0.18) is curious, to say the least–it has one of the
largest stock markets on the planet, and this country is a common subject of
political economic research. But it is still not easy to say its weak positive
correlation in Figure 3 is a clear sign that “systemic” is an inappropriate term.
For comparison, take a phenomenon like air pollution. A standard measure of
air quality is PM2.5, which looks at exposure levels to particulate matter that
is smaller than 2.5 micrograms. One does not successfully dispute that air pol-
lution is a systemic problem if he states that, in recent years, many countries
have exposure levels that are fractions of the most polluted places in the world.
Arguments for or against a theory of systemic air pollution would involve creat-
ing methods to interpret the distribution of data and the relationships between
countries–including the countries that have relatively small air pollution.
To think more about the international distribution of systemic fear, we can
look at three characteristics of the evidence:
1. the relationships between countries
2. the rarity of systemic fear
3. the statistical significance of systemic fear’s distribution
These are not the only relevant characteristics, but knowing more about them
enables us to judge the usage of “systemic” when the data is not uniform across
all countries.
3.1.1 The relationships between countries
In Figure 3 of their NPE paper, Baines and Hager look at the relationship
between systemic fear in the United States and the MSCI World Index. They
identify two qualities of this relationship: a positive correlation in the long-term
(+0.59), and a divergence of systemic fear in the years following the 2008 global
financial crisis (Baines & Hager, 2020, p. 131). Missing from this comparison
of the two series, however, is a breakdown of which countries contribute to
the positive correlation and which do not. Any or all countries other than the
United States could be responsible for the post-2008 divergence of the United
States and the MSCI index. Furthermore, the MSCI World Index is a composite
index that is also weighted by shares. According to a May 29, 2020 fact sheet
(MSCI, 2020), the index has the following weights by country: United States
65.82%, Japan 8.22%, United Kingdom 4.5%, France 3.3%, Switzerland 3.2%
and Other 14.9%. Thus, the long-term positive correlation could be the United
States with itself.
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Figure 5 shows the correlation matrix of how S1 correlates in every possible
pair of in our dataset. Across each row and down each column are the pairings of
two countries. The positive correlations in the matrix are not perfect and neither
are they uniformly distributed across samples. Yet Figure 5 does indicate that
many of the countries have positive correlations with each other. Additionally,
some of the positive correlations are stronger than +0.59, the value in Figure 3
of Baines and Hager (2020).
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Figure 5: Correlation matrix: each country’s S1
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See
Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
One’s threshold for empirical difference will impact how one sees a strong
network of relationships in Figure 5. Yet it is possible to experiment with
thresholds. For example, Figure 6 uses the results of Figure 5 to draw two
networks, where a country is a node and a positive value from the correlation
matrix is an edge. Panel A draws a network where the threshold for an edge is
13
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+0.59. Panel B draws a network where the threshold for an edge is +0.40. The
weights of the edges in Panel B (visualized as line thickness) are determined by
the strength of the positive correlation for each pair’s P1. In both panels, the
majority of countries are networked by their positive relationships. Only South
Korea is separated from each network (it is, however, connected to the United
States and Switzerland by its strong negative relationships).
AUS
CAN
CHE
DEU
JPN NLD
ZAF
SWE
USA
FRA
GBR
A. Edge where corr. of country-to-country S1 > + 0.59
AUS
CANCHE
DEU
FRA
GBR
JPN
NLD
SWE
USA
B. Edge where corr. > + 0.40;
edge weight  corr. of country-to-country P1
Figure 6: Networks of systemic fear? Networks of power?
Source and methods: See Figure 5 for values that create the edges. The
correlation matrix of P1 is not visualized. See Table 3 for the creation of P1. See
Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
The long-term correlations between countries are shown in Figure 5. We
need a different approach to analyze the historical timing of the divergence of
U.S. systemic fear and systemic fear measured with the MSCI World Index.
On the assumption that national systemic fears should be moving together in
the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, Baines and Hager have identified
puzzling evidence in Figure 3 of their paper. But are all countries in the MSCI
World Index going in a different direction than the United States after 2008?
Figure 7 uses this paper’s dataset to perform a breakdown of country-to-
country correlations of S1. In each panel we have a country. The time series
is the average of all of one country’s 60-month correlations with every other
country in the dataset (e.g., average of AUS-S1 ∼ CAN-S1, AUS-S1 ∼ CHE-
S1, AUS-S1 ∼ DEU-S1, ...)). Interestingly, Figure 7 indicates that Baines and
Hager touched on an interesting event: the 2008 global financial crisis scattered
the trends of S1. Countries that were tightly correlated with other countries
in the years before 2008 were not for a few years after. In the cases of France,
Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland and the United States, the changes to the
relationships look severe.
If S1 can differ by country, points of divergence do need to be explained.
Yet Figure 7 might indicate that what has happened since 2008 is not a rea-
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son to downgrade the concept of systemic fear, but rather to look at national
relationships more closely. Since the 2008 financial crisis (marked on the date
of the U.S. federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) there is a pattern
that is shared by many countries in the dataset. The country-to-country corre-
lations of S1 first drop to points where there is virtually no correlation between
countries. Around 2016 there is a noticeable “bounce-back” in the country-to-
country correlations of S1. In fact, the “bounce-back” is so large that, in many
cases, country-to-country correlations of S1 are higher than they were in 2008.
Moreover, there are upward trends in the time series, suggesting that the rise
of average systemic fear (see Figure 4) is producing stronger country-to-country
relationships of this fear.
3.1.2 The rarity of systemic fear
The S&P 500 systemic fear index has moved sideways at an un-
precedented high from 2008 onwards, while the fear of investors in
the MSCI World has plummeted over the same period. Aside from
holders of S&P 500 shares, it appears, at least by BN’s measure,
that capitalists the world over have been rapidly gaining confidence
since the global financial crisis. (Baines & Hager, 2020, p. 124 )
At different points, Baines and Hager show they are holding expectations
that systemic fear should be rising at particular times. Their references to the
global financial crisis of 2008 and Brexit indicate they, like many other political
economists, are keen to know if a concept or method can explain key historical
events. Yet it is doubtful that we know enough about international systemic
fear to suggest that Si should be moving one way or another. What does it
mean when the measure of Si tells us that “capitalists the world over have been
rapidly gaining confidence since the global financial crisis”? Does it mean the
measure is broken? Or does it mean that capitalists outside the United States
are actually regaining confidence?
Answering these questions of accuracy cannot be solved quickly and it is
likely that the scale of this paper is not suited to an investigation into whether
Si is meaningful in every context. Yet these gaps in our knowledge affect Baines
and Hager’s argument as well. Without a more detailed outline of how systemic
fear relates to other crises, political or otherwise, Baines and Hager’s usage of
the Brexit shows signs of confirmation bias:
Perhaps the most compelling case against the systemic fear index
is the fact that it has been sharply falling for the UK even in the
context of the vote for Brexit in the referendum of June 2016. Other
quantitative indicators of business confidence, such as the Harg-
reaves Lansdown Investor Confidence Index, as well as qualitative
surveys of business leader sentiment, all point to growing a climate
of fear in the wake of the Brexit referendum. (Baines & Hager, 2020,
p. 132)
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Figure 7: 60-month rolling correlations of (S1 ∼ S1), average of allcombinations
Note: the dotted vertical line is set to September 7, 2008, the date the U.S.
federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Source and methods: For each country’s time series, the average 60-month rolling
correlation with every other country is taken. See Table 2 for the creation of S1.
See Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
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Why must Britain’s systemic fear be high in the time of Brexit? Brexit is legit-
imately a front-page news story, but are the swirls of social uncertainty about
confidence in obedience? Incompleteness of their model notwithstanding, Bich-
ler and Nitzan delimit systemic fear in two important ways. First, they argue
that the purpose of measuring systemic fear is to look at the drop in a type
of confidence that is fundamental to believing that the forward-looking logic of
capitalist investment will carry into the future–confidence in obedience. Thus,
the rise of Si is a logical rise in capitalist fear if we suppose that capitalism
has a forward-looking logic which very rarely breaks down at its roots.2Second,
confidence in obedience–the other “side” of systemic fear–is different than the
confidence needed for capitalists to account for risk. In the latter case there is
uncertainty about the future, but the logic of capitalization is still functioning
as a social ritual that accounts for the uncertainties of the future. As Frank
H. Knight argues, we need to see the gradations and differences in economic
uncertainty. Some uncertainty, for example, “is easily converted into effective
certainty; for in a considerable number of such cases the results become pre-
dictable in accordance with the laws of chance, and the error in such prediction
approaches zero as the number of cases is increased” (Knight, 1921, p. 46).
If we choose not to abandon the concept of systemic fear just yet, we have
the opportunity to investigate how we can avoid confirmation biases in the
future. For example, Figure 8 plots two confidence indices from the OECD–a
business confidence index (BCI) and a consumer confidence index (CCI). The
time series of Great Britain are in bold and Germany, France and the United
States are added for comparison. Great Britain’s CCI has dropped since 2016,
but its BCI has been increasing with a seasonal cycle. Additionally, its BCI after
2016 is not visibly different than the BCIs of Germany, France and the United
States. This evidence is not a simple counter-point to the Hargreaves Lansdown
Investor Confidence Index; but it is a counter-point to the way Baines and Hager
use the Hargreaves Index. It might be too early to say systemic fear has a fatal
theoretical problem because the systemic fear of Great Britain “should” be rising
in the context of Brexit.
Given that systemic fear cannot be, according to the current norms of cap-
italist behavior, anything like “everyday” uncertainty, we should re-open the
hypothesis that systemic fear is a rare state of crisis. What this means for the
duration of this state, I do not know. But it does mean that we need to be just
as open-minded about drops in systemic fear as we are about its rises. We also
need to investigate how systemic fear is potentially different than other mea-
sures of financial confidence both theoretically and empirically. Obsessed with
the future, many economists, financial analysts and journalists offer methods
to see the signs of such phenomena as low economic productivity, inflated asset
2“... the only reason for capitalists to buy stocks and in so doing bid up the stock price/wage
ratio is that they expect this ratio to rise even further. And the fact that they believe that this
ratio will go up attests to their confidence in obedience – the confidence that the underlying
population will not expropriate them and that the system as a whole will not fail them. In
this sense, our power index offers an objective measure of capitalist confidence – at least on
the outside” (Bichler & Nitzan, 2016, p. 142).
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Figure 8: OECD Confidence Indices
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators: Business tendency and consumer
opinion surveys: (BCI:
https://data.oecd.org/leadind/business-confidence-index-bci.htm, CCI:
https://data.oecd.org/leadind/business-confidence-index-bci.htm, both
accessed on May 19, 2020)
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bubbles and over-valuated stock markets. Are these phenomena systemic fear
by other names?
Figure 9 plots average 60-month correlations between S2 and three measures
that are commonly used for investors to assess market confidence and long-term
valuation. The “Buffet indicator”, as it is sometimes called because Warren Buf-
fet said in 2001 “that it is probably the best single measure of where valuations
stand at any given moment” (Buffett, 2001), is a ratio of total market capital-
ization to GDP. The CAPE3 is a three-year cyclically-adjusted price-earnings
ratio. This form of price-earnings ratio was first popularized by Robert Shiller.
It measures ratio of prices to a moving average of earnings (three years in this
case). When this ratio is high, “[long-term] investors would be well advised, in-
dividually, to lower their exposure to the stock market” (Shiller, 2005, p. 177).
The third measure, is the OECD BCI, which was used in Figure 8. The BCI
uses opinion surveys to assess “developments in production, orders and stocks
of finished goods in the industry sector”. According to the OECD, “it can be
used to monitor output growth and to anticipate turning points in economic
activity” (OECD, n.d.).
Figure 9 is interesting because it shows systemic fear is often different than
the other measures of investor confidence–to say nothing of differences in the
theory behind these measures. Moments when S2 has a 60-month positive rela-
tionship with another measure appear to be brief and occur during bear markets.
In the top left panel, for example, two vertical lines annotate instances when the
60-month correlation between S2 and the “Buffet Indicator” jumps. The first
line is Black Monday (October 19, 1987). The second line is the U.S. federal
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (September 7, 2008), one of the many
events at the start of the global financial crisis of 2008. By comparison, the
three bottom panels in Figure 9 show that the “Buffet Indicator”, the CAPE3
and the BCI have positive relationships throughout the market cycle.
Figure 9 cannot tell us that systemic fear is what political economists want
to be looking at. Rather, the figure indicates that systemic fear, assuming it is
theoretically sound, is giving a different picture than other indicators of investor
and business confidence. In particular, its picture of capitalist confidence after
2008 is almost the inverse of what other indicators show.
3.1.3 Systemic fear’s distribution
As quoted above, Baines and Hager observe that the systemic fear of investors in
the United States, measured by the S&P 500, has been moving “sideways” since
2008. If one looks at Figure 2 again, one will see that this plateau is between
+0.40 and +0.60. If we remember that a measure of systemic fear is built from
a moving correlation of prices and earnings, plateauing at a “moderate” level of
correlation strength might be puzzling. What will make systemic fear go closer
to +1.00? Is +0.60 some type of ceiling?
Kliman and Baines and Hager have both critiqued the concept of systemic
fear in reference to events in time where systemic fear, if meaningful, should be
high or low.3Nobody, to my knowledge, has investigated where “high” systemic
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Figure 9: 60-month correlations between S2 and other indicators
(all countries)
Note: the dark line in each panel is the mean 60-month correlation. The shaded
area is one standard deviation above and below the mean. S1 and S3 yield
similar results.
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S2. See Appendix for
breakdown of data by country. See Table 8 for country data of ’Buffet Indicator’,
and Table 9 for country data of CAPE3 ratio. OECD BCI:
https://data.oecd.org/leadind/business-confidence-index-bci.htm,
accessed on May 19, 2020
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fear starts on a continuous scale. This investigation is important because the
methods that make a measure of systemic fear also impact where the lines of
statistical significance will be drawn.
S1 is produced from a moving correlation, but it is also a moving average of a
moving correlation. This last fact changes the significance of the numbers. The
moving average of a moving correlation will stay close to zero when the moving
average window has a wide spread of correlations between -1 and 1. Moreover,
the canceling-out of positive and negative correlations in the same window will
make it harder for a measure of Si to have values we traditionally associate with
moderate or strong correlations.
Figure 10 visualizes the statistical problem and helps us understand that
we are informally hypothesis testing when we think that sampled evidence is
not strong enough to be convinced. A step forward involves thinking about
what null hypothesis we are testing against. I believe a reasonable starting
point is to have the null hypothesis be: prices and earnings have zero long-term
correlation. With this null hypothesis we can use random numbers to produce
null distributions of systemic fear.
We can see the three randomly-generated distributions in Panel A of Figure
10. Each measure of systemic fear produces a null distribution with a mean of
zero. Yet notice that the standard deviations are different. S1, the measure
used by Bichler and Nitzan and Baines and Hager, has the smallest standard
deviation of the measures with which we are experimenting. This indicates that
the probability S1 of producing values above +0.25 and below −0.25 through
randomness is very low.
In Panels B, C and D of Figure 10 the respective measure of Si is transformed
into a Z-score of the null distribution. This transformation helps us see that
there are both statistically insignificant and statistically significant measures of
3Kliman (2011) was one of the first to critique Bichler and Nitzan’s concept of systemic
fear. Kliman makes it very clear that he thinks it is impossible for systemic fear to be
meaningful concept because the evidence is showing a rise of systemic fear in two periods, June
1953–August 1962 and August 1962–December 1973. Lest I be perceived to be exaggerating
Kliman’s argument that systemic fear cannot be high at particular points in time, here is
a key quotation in full: “But B&N haven’t merely gotten their facts wrong. Because their
facts are wrong, so is their paper’s key claim that we can infer that investors are gripped by
“systemic fear” when the relationship between current profits and equity prices is strong and
positive. They tell us that the two periods in which systemic fear prevailed were two periods
of acute crisis, the Great Depression and the 2000s. If a strongly positive correlation between
current profits and share prices were another exceptional feature of these periods of crisis,
then the notion that we can infer the existence of systemic fear from the positive correlation
might be plausible. But the 1930s and 2000s were not exceptional in that respect, as we have
seen. And the other two strongly positive-correlation periods, which run from the early 1950s
through the early 1970s, cannot plausibly be characterized as a time of systemic fear. On the
contrary, that era was the so-called golden age of capitalism. So a strongly positive correlation
between current profits and equity prices does not allow us to infer the existence of systemic
fear” (Kliman, 2011, p. 64, italics in original). In response to Kliman, Bichler and Nitzan
acknowledged their factual error, analyzed the significance of a high correlation of prices and
earnings in period to which Kliman refers, and produced a alternative method for measuring
systemic fear (Bichler & Nitzan, 2011, 2016). To my knowledge, Kliman has not explained if
his views on the concept would change if Bichler and Nitzan got their facts “right”.
21
McMahon, J. Working Paper
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0
1
2
3
4
A. Randomly generated systemic fear
random S1
random S2
random S3
4 2 0 2 4 6 8
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
B. Z-score: S1 relative to null distribution
random S1
S1
4 2 0 2 4 6
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
C. Z-score: S2 relative to null distribution
random S2
S2
5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
D. Z-score: S3 relative to null distribution
random S3
S3
Figure 10: Distribution of systemic fear, relative to
null-distributions of each variable
Source and methods: rolling correlations of random numbers are done with two
series with 1,000,000 observations. Z-scores calculated with the following results:
nullS1 mean: 0, nullS1 std: 0.09; nullS2 mean: 0, nullS2 std: 0.18; nullS3 mean:
0, nullS3 std: 0.26. See Table 2 for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See Appendix
for breakdown of data by country.
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systemic fear, relative to the null distribution. Observed samples to the right of
the dotted vertical line are above +1.96, which is statistically significant when
α = 0.05. We can also set α much lower. Figure 11 plots the S1 of each country
in the dataset and highlights any period when a value from Figure 10 has a
Z-score greater than 4 and is statistically significant when α = 6.33426e − 05.
Interestingly, the period from the early 2000s to the present is shaded in most
countries. S1 is plateauing and even decreasing at times–yet the levels are still
high, according to the null hypothesis we are testing.
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Figure 11: S1, by country and highlights when Zα < 6.33426e− 05
Source and methods: see Figure 10.
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4 Another look at systemic fear and power
The previous section offered reasons to revisit Bichler and Nitzan’s concept of
systemic fear. This section re-tests the connection between systemic fear and
the power index (Pi). The addition of countries and the gathering of more data
revealed that countries such as Australia, Canada and Sweden have positive
correlations between S1 and P1. Experimentation with additional measures of
systemic fear and power can produce extra results.
4.1 Testing different measures of systemic fear and power
Six measurements were introduced in Section 2–three measures of systemic fear
and three measures of the power index. To not distract the reader that was
already familiar with Bichler and Nitzan’s research and Baines and Hager’s NPE
paper, I tried to use S1 and P1 in the previous section as much as possible.
Moving forward, we do not need to limit political economic analysis to the
measures created by Bichler and Nitzan.
What would be the reason to add more measures? The works of Bichler
and Nitzan are a mixture of empirical research and political economic theory.
By analytically separating the two dimensions, there is room for empirical ex-
perimentation if we retain the essences of systemic fear and the power index.
Different versions of systemic fear and power produce a spectrum of results,
whereby we can identify what happens when parameters are changed.
Systemic fear, in particular, is ripe for experimentation. It measures fear
that is expressed through a type of behavior–basing prices on past earnings–but
it is unlikely that this behavior would be uniform across all capitalists in time
and place. As is the case when someone applies the forward-looking ritual of
discounting future streams of income, the manner someone looks to past earnings
could be affected by accounting methods and social and cultural variables such
as business norms and subjectivity. As a small thought experiment, think about
the 12-month correlation window in S1. What if that window was narrowed to
10 months? Or what if fearful capitalists were looking to the past earnings of 16
months, or even more? Political economists can debate the significance of such
variations, but the original 12-months parameter is only a constructed estimate
of how capitalists, in a state of fear about the future, would base prices on past
earnings.
Compared to S1, the measures S2 and S3 are sensitive to different changes
in the correlation between prices and earnings. S2 is produced with a seasonal
decomposition, whereby seasonality and residuals are removed from each time
series.4 S3 is the product of 12-month differencing, which is a way to remove
long-term trends from a time series. Without a long-term trend between the
levels of prices and earnings, the result of a correlation window of 120 months is
not necessarily positive and high. With respect to the measure of more power
indices, P2 and P3 curiously use different denominators in the ratio between
4I used the seasonal_decompose function from the Python library statsmodels.tsa.seasonal.
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capitalized power and the underlying population.
Figure 12 uses Canada as an example of the time series that were produced
for the twelve countries in the dataset. The power indices are not that different
from each other. In particular, P2 and P3 are similar because the former uses
average income per capita in its denominator and the latter uses nominal GDP
per capita. With respect to the measures of systemic fear, there is a shared
long-term trend, but different methods are producing differences in in the short
term.
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Figure 12: Power and systemic fear indices of Canada
Source and methods: See Table 3 for the creation of P1, P2 and P3. See Table 2
for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See Appendix for breakdown of data by
country.
4.2 Analysis of results
With a dataset of power and systemic fear indices, I wanted to know two things:
1. If countries had positive correlations between power and systemic fear,
even if it was not necessarily a positive correlation between S1 and P1.
2. If positive results were produced when we use averages as expected mea-
sures of power and systemic fear at an international level.
4.2.1 Relationships across all variables
Figure 13 summarizes all of the correlations between power indices (Pi) and
systemic fear (Si). In each row is a systemic fear variable of a particular country.
Each column is a specific power index, P1, P2 or P3.
The results in Figure 13 are interesting for a few reasons. First, a few
countries, such as the United States, Germany and Sweden, show positive cor-
relations across all nine possible relationships. Second, there are some countries
that we can find having at least one strong positive relationship between power
and systemic fear. Switzerland, Australia and South Korea would be examples
of this result. Third, there appears to be a pattern that is shared by France,
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Netherlands and the United Kingdom. At best, there are a few moderate posi-
tive relationships in their results, but their correlations are positive or negative
in a similar way: S1 is positive, S2 is close to zero, and S3 is positive and slightly
stronger than S1.
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Figure 13: Summary table: Correlations between Systemic Fear
and Power, by country and variable
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See Table 3
for the creation of P1, P2 and P3. See Appendix for breakdown of data by
country.
4.2.2 Expected values across countries
Baines and Hager first discovered that the correlation between power and sys-
temic fear varied across countries. In their summary of findings, they concluded
that Germany was the only country in their dataset that had similar results
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to the United States. We can now identify more positive relationships between
systemic fear and power at the national level.
With a larger dataset, my results also reveal that additional countries, such
Netherlands and South Africa, are different than the United States. In the
case of South Africa, the partial results (due to missing data) suggest that it
might have a moderate negative relationship between power and systemic fear–a
quality that is unique in this dataset.
Moving forward, the international evidence of the relationship of power and
systemic fear might not be as weak as Baines and Hager claim, even when
the two variables are not always moving together and in the same ways. We
can still create an international model of systemic fear, but with a alternative
interpretation of the distribution of the values in Si and Pi. As we saw in
Figures 5 and 7, the systemic fears of many countries move together. These
strong relationships are the reason why average systemic fear, measured three
ways, has been rising. If the United States was exceptional in having rising
systemic fear, an unweighted average with 11 other countries could not produce
the results in Figure 4.
In probabilistic terms, the average value is often the expected value. With
averages of systemic fear and power, we can propose the hypothesis that the
international dimension can be seen as the sampled mean of what capitalists are
doing in different countries and at specified intervals of time. The averages of
systemic fear were plotted in Figure 4. Figure 14 plots the average and standard
deviation of each version of the power index. Similar to what we saw in Figure
4, average power has been rising since 1980.5
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Figure 14: Three measures of power (P1, P2, P3)
Source and methods: See Table 3 for the creation of P1, P2 and P3. See
Appendix for breakdown of data by country.
Figure 15 produces a three-by-three grid of expected systemic fear plotted
against expected power. Although the extent to which the movement of ex-
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pected power can explain the movement of expected systemic fear varies, there
is a positive relationship across all combinations. Moreover, specific combina-
tions yield strong positive results. The first column of plots (S1 ∼ P1, S2 ∼ P1,
S3 ∼ P1) suggests that the variance of P1 can explain between 47 and 61 percent
of the variance of the sampled means of systemic fear.
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Figure 15: Relationships between sampled means, monthly: S1, S2,
... , P3
Source and methods: See Table 2 for the creation of S1, S2 and S3. See Table 3
for the creation of P1, P2 and P3. See Appendix for breakdown of data by
country.
5It should not be surprising that P1 has the largest slope and a longer-term trajectory
upward. Compared to a wage rate (all activities or manufacutring), the denominators in P2
(average income per capita) and P3 (nominal GDP per capita) are prone to rise when the
social average is pulled up by the top percentiles of income.
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5 Conclusion
As content in Baines and Hager’s NPE article, systemic fear’s relation with
power is the second of four parts. After systemic fear they continue down the
path of Bichler and Nitzan’s argument and test other relationships: the power
index with the inversed growth of employment (labeled “strategic sabotage” in
reference to Bichler and Niztan’s usage of Thorstein Veblen’s term (Nitzan &
Bichler, 2009; Veblen, 2004)) and the growth of employment with the yield of
10-year government bonds (labeled the “CasP Policy Cycle” (Baines & Hager,
2020, p. 124)). The sum of their results lead Baines and Hager to conclude that
the CasP model of the stock market is in a tough position going forward. The
CasP model could “treat the US as a unique case”, but this comes at the high
price of explaining what is happening in other major stock markets: “The main
lesson from our analysis here is that the evolution of the stock market in other
advanced capitalist countries cannot simply be read off from the US experience”
(Baines & Hager, 2020, p. 137).
I will have to leave it to the reader to judge the manner in which Baines
and Hager use systemic fear as a premise for the steps that follow its analysis.
However, this paper has shown that, as a political economic concept, systemic
fear is likely more promising than Baines and Hager believe. In fact, the closer
we look at systemic fear, the more we can see how it can support, rather than
undermine, Baines and Hager’s goal of explaining “the global unevenness and
continued national diversity in capitalist development” (Baines & Hager, 2020,
p. 137). There is global unevenness and national diversity across the systemic
fear of twelve countries–Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Japan, Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United States. But this national diversity is not so great that we are unable to
conceptualize and model systemic fear’s international characteristics. There is,
despite national differences, evidence of rising systemic fear at an international
level. And there is, despite national differences, a positive relationship between
expected systemic fear and expected power at an international level.
Going forward, we should certainly not ignore some of the negative results.
For example, my results for Great Britain and France are similar to those of
Baines and Hager. Further testing and research would be needed to explain why
it is that certain countries–countries like Great Britain, France, Netherlands and
South Africa–are different from those that have positive relationships between
Si and Pi.
In addition to diving deeper into some of the negative results, there is op-
portunity to building a richer picture of when advanced capitalist countries
are experiencing systemic fear at the same time. Figure 7 deconstructed the
country-to-country 60-month correlations of S1. The aggregate of these cor-
relations, plotted in Figure 16, shows there are visible peaks of high average
country-to-country 60-month correlations of S1. These peaks have occurred
near or during some of the major political economic crises of the past forty
years. As of this writing, we are living through another peak of cross-correlated
S1. If one decides to take a closer look at the concept of systemic fear, the
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significance of this pattern is certainly worth investigating.
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Figure 16: Average 60-month correlation of S1 (all countries)
Source and methods: see Figure 7 for the 60-month rolling correlation of each
country’s S1 with other countries in the dataset. Dates of financial events were
taken from Wikipedia.
6 Appendix
The following tables provide country breakdowns for the data in this paper. As
stated in many of the titles for the tables, the majority of the data was accessed
through Global Financial Data. The notable exception is found in Table 7.
Table 4: Data sources for Composite Index Prices – from Global Financial
Data
Country Ticker Frequency Start Date End Date
Australia _AORDD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
Canada _GSPTSED Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
France _CACTD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
Germany _CXKXD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
Japan _TOPXD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
Netherlands _AAXD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
South Africa _JALSHD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
South Korea _KS11D Monthly 01/31/1962 04/30/2020
Sweden _OMXSPID Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
Switzerland _SPIXD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
United Kingdom _FTASD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
United States _SPXD Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
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Table 5: Data sources for P/E ratios – from Global Financial Data
Country Code Frequency Start Date End Date
Australia SYAUSPM Monthly 07/31/1969 04/30/2020
Canada SYCANPTM Monthly 01/31/1956 03/31/2020
France SYFRAPM Monthly 09/30/1971 04/30/2020
Germany SYDEUPM Monthly 07/31/1969 04/30/2020
Japan SYJPNPTM Monthly 01/31/1956 12/31/2019
Netherlands SYNLDPM Monthly 07/31/1969 01/31/2020
South Africa SYZAFPM Monthly 01/31/1960 01/31/2020
South Korea SYKORPM Monthly 03/31/1974 01/31/2020
Sweden SYSWEPM Monthly 07/31/1969 04/30/2020
Switzerland SYCHEPM Monthly 07/31/1969 04/30/2020
United Kingdom _PFTASD Monthly 12/31/1950 04/30/2020
United States SYUSAPM Monthly 01/31/1950 04/30/2020
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